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Canada’s Minister of International Trade, David Emerson, heralded a free trade
agreement with the European Free Trade Association in June by saying “Canada is
back in the game.” In July, the government announced talks on free trade with
Colombia, Peru and CARICOM (the Caribbean Community). While the new
agreement is an overdue triumph over special interests, and western-hemisphere
liberalization offers economic and political benefits, a broader view of trade policy
shows that Canada has fallen behind — and is perhaps even playing in the wrong
arena.
To be sure, with the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations in the World
Trade Organization stalled, Canada should not merely watch as other countries
pursue alternative trade strategies. Rather than poking about various corners of the
world for new bilateral trade deals, however, Canada’s top priority should be
guarding and enhancing links with its most important partner: the United States.
Canadians seem to have forgotten some key trade interests that were front-
of-mind 15 years ago. Following the 1988 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA),
many observers saw threats to Canada from proliferating bilateral deals. The main
concern was the emergence of hub-and-spoke arrangements — countries with
larger economies or better negotiators amassing lots of bilateral arrangements with
themselves at the centre.
For Canada, the prospect of life as a single spoke on a US hub was
worrisome. Ron Wonnacott,
1 among others, argued that a potential US-Mexican
bilateral FTA threatened Canada in two ways. It would undermine support for
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The Economics of Overlapping Free Trade Areas and the Mexican Challenge. Canadian-American
Committee 60.multilateral liberalization and the most-favoured-nation principle that had
underpinned international trade since World War II in both our North American
neighbours, the United States being of special concern. And more pointedly, the
United States would occupy a privileged position as the hub for bilateral
agreements with Mexico and Canada. Only US producers would have enhanced
access to consumers in both spoke countries, and only US intermediate-goods
users and consumers would have access to products from both spoke countries.
Add more spokes to the US hub, and Canada’s relative position would get worse
yet.
That separate Canadian agreements with Mexico or other spoke countries
could, in principle, address the latter threat was cold comfort. With less to offer
prospective partners than the United States, Canada would have a tougher time
negotiating barriers down. Like any individual spoke country, Canada would
suffer isolation in trade disputes with the United States. And serial US deals with
other partners might set protectionist precedents that would hurt Canada in the
future.
The upshot was that Canada elbowed its way into the US-Mexico
negotiations. The resulting North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in
1994 diluted some Canadian advantages in the US market. Yet a separate US-
Mexico bilateral deal would have done that anyway, and there were offsetting
advantages. Canada got more durable dispute-resolution machinery — and
Canadian intermediate-goods users and consumers got the same access to Mexican
products as their US counterparts, boosting Canadian competitiveness and
prosperity.
The NAFTA, however, was the beginning and the end of Canada’s
involvement in US bilaterals. In 1996 Canada signed an FTA with Israel, which had
had its own US bilateral since 1985, and in 1997 another with Chile, which did a
separate US deal in 2003. But while the former ought to allow trilateral duty-free
flows, and while the latter once looked like a precursor to Chile joining the
NAFTA, neither has occurred. So Canada has fitfully pursued a handful of other
bilaterals. 2001 saw an agreement with Costa Rica, which — along with the other
Central American countries and the Dominican Republic — has since done a US
deal. But Canadian negotiations with the Andean countries, other Central
American countries, the Dominican Republic, Singapore, and South Korea have
dragged on for years — with none of the parties feeling much urgency to get them
done.
Mexico, meanwhile, has been active on the bilateral front. And, more
importantly, the US has added myriad spokes to its hub (Figure 1). It has deals
with Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Singapore, Peru and Colombia. It
started talking to South Korea around the same time Canada did, and signed a
deal in April of this year.
The US-Australia FTA in 2004 was perhaps most significant for those who
recall the dangers of hub-and-spoke arrangements. It vividly showed the reduced
interest in multilateralism among key developed countries. Linking the United
States to another advanced country with a similar economic profile to its own, it
eroded Canada’s privileged place in the US market worse than any other US
bilateral. Canada should have made an aggressive effort to get inside that
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AAn agreement between the US Congress and administration in May
clearing the way for deals with Panama and Peru highlights the final danger:
precedents that hurt Canada’s interests. Congress required labour standards in
those deals — an opening for US protectionist barriers that Canada and Mexico
successfully resisted in the NAFTA. Only a resolute optimist would predict that
Congress will never seek similar provisions against Canada.
Clearly, the current minority federal government feels ill-placed to liberalize
trade. The farmers who profit from cartels in milk, eggs and poultry — even the
Canadian Wheat Board — seem now to have enough clout to commit Canada to
agricultural interventionism, which has shredded our international credibility and
moved us from centre- to side-stage at multilateral talks.
Yet fear of powerful, protected constituencies did not kill previous rounds
of multilateral liberalization — nor the Canada-US FTA and the NAFTA. What
outweighed it in those past deals was a strategic focus on the game Canada needed
to play — and in the NAFTA case, desire to avoid a carving up of world trade by
competitive bilateralism that cut Canadians out. What would such a strategic focus
entail today?
The best option remains multilateralism. But what if the Doha round is so
bogged down, and Canada’s agricultural protectionism so pig-headed, that
progress on that front is blocked? In that case, Canada could address the hub-and-
spoke threat directly, demanding a place at the table whenever the United States
held bilateral talks. Yet such a policy would be unappealingly reactive, and if
inclusion meant accepting whatever provisions the United States pushed its other
partners to accept, Canadians might find access to the hub unattractively costly.
A key further option is to broaden and deepen the bilateral relationship that
matters above all others — Canada’s relationship with the United States.
Regulatory harmonization in goods and services — particularly if achieved as part
of discussions between the United States and the European Community — and
freer flows of capital and people, offer more benefits and protection against US
barriers than anything available from bilateral deals in Latin America or Asia.
Agreements on subsidies, or on replacing antidumping laws with common
competition policies, are more likely with the United States than with anyone else.
Going all the way to a customs union would give Canada’s economy a powerful
boost, and would ensure inclusion in any further US agreements — powerful
security against getting stuck on a spoke.
This option does not preclude pursuing others — but to overcome US
protectionism and inertia, not to mention dealing with reservations at home, it
must be a clear priority in the government’s political and negotiating agenda. The
summit of NAFTA leaders in Montebello, August 21 and 22, offers a chance, not
only to resist the security-related thickening of North American borders, but to
push aggressively for measures that would cement Canada’s position as a gateway
to the North American market.
Multilateral liberalization demands courage, getting into US bilaterals
demands sharp elbows, and a deeper Canada-US economic union requires tough
political decisions. All offer greater benefits than proliferating hubs and spokes,
and they are better games for Canada to play.References:
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